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FREE AND FAIR:  JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN 
ELECTIONS BEYOND THE PURCELL PRINCIPLE 
AND ANDERSON-BURDICK BALANCING 
Danika Elizabeth Watson* 
 
The United States’s politically charged 2020 federal election, conducted 
in the midst of a global pandemic, seismically shook the fault lines of state 
and local elections administration nationwide.  Voters, candidates, parties, 
states, and political campaigns brought hundreds of claims to the courts, 
seeking judicial intervention to protect equity in their voting rights.  The 2020 
pandemic election cases demonstrated that Equal Protection claims relying 
on the Anderson-Burdick balancing test are both overly reliant on judicial 
discretion and highly vulnerable to invalidation under the Purcell principle. 
This Note examines the equal protection challenges raised in courts 
throughout the country in 2020 to demonstrate the need for a voter 
equity-based approach to equal protection claims that goes beyond the 
Purcell principle’s weak threshold protections.  This Note proposes the 
Carolene test, a novel threshold test for equal protection claims in voting 
rights cases that determines the appropriateness of judicial intervention 
based on:  (1) whether an election process or procedure change relates to 
voters’ ability to participate in the political process, (2) whether the change 
prejudices discrete and insular minorities, and (3) whether the change would 
expand or diminish the franchise. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In a record-breaking amount of litigation surrounding the 2020 federal 
election, voters, candidates, parties, states, and advocacy groups challenged 
burdens on the fundamental right to vote during the COVID-19 pandemic.1  
This wave of litigation demonstrates competing visions of autonomy, equity, 
and judicial intervention in election law.2  Voting holds a protected place in 
the United States as a right “of the most fundamental significance under our 
constitutional structure.”3  Though the U.S. Constitution does not provide an 
affirmative right to vote, courts recognize the right to vote as “fundamental 
to our concept of democratic government”4 because “[t]he right to vote freely 
for the candidate of one’s choice is of the essence of a democratic society, 
and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative 
government.”5 
In practice, an individual’s ability to exercise the fundamental right to vote 
is subject to the many administrative limitations necessary for states to 
conduct and regulate fair and orderly elections.  Voting is an administrative 
process, and states retain a constitutionally delegated power to regulate 
 
 1. See Alana Abramson, ‘A Litigation Arms Race.’  Why the 2020 Election Could Come 
Down to the Courts, TIME (Oct. 22, 2020, 10:44 AM), https://time.com/5902389/election-
2020-lawsuits-litigation/ [https://perma.cc/JK46-X9E2]; Lila Hassan & Dan Glaun, 
COVID-19 and the Most Litigated Presidential Election in Recent U.S. History:  How the 
Lawsuits Break Down, PBS:  FRONTLINE (Oct. 28, 2020), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/ 
article/covid-19-most-litigated-presidential-election-in-recent-us-history/ 
[https://perma.cc/FU7Q-NTMW]; This Election Season Is Shaping Up to Be the Most 
Litigated Ever, NPR (Sept. 17, 2020, 5:00 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/ 
09/11/911870069/this-election-season-is-shaping-up-to-be-the-most-litigated-ever 
[https://perma.cc/B267-MQEY]. 
 2. See Hassan & Glaun, supra note 1; Abramson, supra note 1; This Election Season Is 
Shaping Up to Be the Most Litigated Ever, supra note 1.  This Note focuses on election 
litigation, before and during the 2020 election season, related to voter access and 
enfranchisement.  This Note does not substantively consider the brief series of highly 
publicized and largely unsuccessful postelection lawsuits brought on behalf of the Republican 
Party and President Donald J. Trump’s campaign challenging the election results after 
President-elect Joseph Biden was declared the winner of the 2020 election. See, e.g., Zahavah 
Levine & Jacob Kovacs-Goodman, Post-Election Litigation in Battleground States, 
HEALTHYELECTIONS.ORG (Nov. 20, 2020), https://healthyelections.org/sites/default/files/ 
2020-11/Post-Election_Litigation.pdf [https://perma.cc/4PKD-KK5D] (surveying and 
synthesizing the 2020 post-election litigation); Harper Neidig, Texas Sues States Biden Won 
in Supreme Court, Seeking to Delay Electoral College Vote, HILL (Dec. 8, 2020, 10:11 AM), 
https://thehill.com/regulation/court-battles/529209-texas-sues-biden-states-in-supreme-
court-seeking-to-delay-electoral [https://perma.cc/GJF7-T7A7]; Voting Rights Litigation 
2020, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (July 8, 2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-
work/court-cases/voting-rights-litigation-2020#key-cases [https://perma.cc/JQ6D-HXXR]; 
see also Stephen Collinson & Maeve Reston, Biden Defeats Trump in an Election He Made 
About Character of the Nation and the President, CNN (Nov. 7, 2020), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/07/politics/joe-biden-wins-us-presidential-election/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/NE4Q-S2RR]. 
 3. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (quoting Illinois Bd. of Elections v. 
Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979)). 
 4. Miller v. Treadwell, 245 P.3d 867, 868–69 (Alaska 2010) (quoting Dansereau v. 
Ulmer, 903 P.2d 555, 559 (Alaska 1995)). 
 5. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964). 
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elections that grants them wide latitude to dictate the “time, place, and 
manner” of election administration.6  While courts recognize and protect the 
individual’s fundamental right to vote, courts also recognize the procedural 
reality that the state must play an active role in structuring elections “if they 
are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to 
accompany the democratic processes.”7  Further, each state’s administration 
of an election facilitates voters’ ability to access and exercise their 
fundamental right to the franchise; in any given election, between thirty-five 
and sixty percent of eligible voters do not cast a ballot.8 
One predominant judicial tool for analyzing constitutional challenges to 
this fundamental right is the Anderson-Burdick balancing test, which allows 
courts to evaluate burdens on the right to vote.9  It does so by balancing the 
character and magnitude of a burden against the state’s precise interests in 
imposing the burden, while considering the extent to which those interests 
make the burden necessary.10  Although the Anderson-Burdick balancing test 
remains the predominant mode of analyzing equal protection claims 
challenging burdens on the right to vote that do not otherwise rise to the level 
of strict scrutiny, the doctrine is roundly criticized as underdetermined and 
overly reliant on judicial discretion.11 
Historically, many of the challenged burdens on voting rights evaluated 
under the Fourteenth Amendment have involved voter qualifications and 
registration.12  However, the wave of litigation over the highly contested 
 
 6. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 4, cl. 1; Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legislature, 
141 S. Ct. 28 (2020) (mem.); see also Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 
196 (2008). 
 7. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433 (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)). 
 8. See Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux et al., Why Many Americans Don’t Vote and Why for 
Some, This Year Could Be Different., FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Oct. 26, 2020, 6:00 AM), 
https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/non-voters-poll-2020-election/ [https://perma.cc/9GN3-
ETLE]. 
 9. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 432–44; Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S 780, 786 (1983).  
Courts apply the Anderson-Burdick framework to equal protection voting claims brought 
under both the U.S. Constitution and state constitutions, as illustrated by the court’s treatment 
of the Alaska Constitution in the case study discussed in Part III. See also Sonneman v. State, 
969 P.2d 632, 636–38 (Alaska 1998) (citing O’Callaghan v. State, 914 P.2d 1250, 1253–54 
(Alaska 1996)). 
 10. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 432–44; Anderson, 460 U.S at 786. 
 11. See, e.g., Rick Hasen, The Biggest Problem with the Supreme Court’s Opinion in the 
Wisconsin Voting Case Was Not the Result (Which Was Still Wrong), but the Court’s 
Sloppiness and Nonchalance About Voting Rights and What That Means for November, 
ELECTION L. BLOG (Apr. 10, 2020, 12:39 PM), https://electionlawblog.org/?p=110647 
[https://perma.cc/8K5Y-NU7Z]; Derek T. Muller, The Fundamental Weakness of Flabby 
Balancing Tests in Federal Election Law Litigation, EXCESS OF DEMOCRACY (Apr. 20, 2020), 
https://excessofdemocracy.com/blog/2020/4/the-fundamental-weakness-of-flabby-
balancing-tests-in-federal-election-law-litigation [https://perma.cc/DCX7-R798]. 
 12. See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (upholding California’s 
restrictions on felons’ voting rights under the Fourteenth Amendment); Harper v. Va. State 
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (finding that a Virginia poll tax violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when it makes the affluence of the voter or 
the payment of a fee an electoral standard for voter qualification); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 
U.S. 339 (1960) (finding that an Alabama gerrymander that diluted the Black vote in Tuskegee 
violated the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
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2020 elections in the middle of a pandemic predominantly focused on 
different targets:  the tension among inequity in the individual voter’s ability 
to access and exercise the franchise, state legislatures’ autonomy to conduct 
elections, and judicial intervention in the state-run process of administering 
an election.13  This pandemic-era litigation interrogates how the design of the 
electoral process impacts voters’ ability to exercise the franchise, examining 
how a state’s administrative process levies disparate impacts and unequal 
burdens on voters who are minorities based on age, race, and health status.14  
The Anderson-Burdick balancing test is a highly fact-based framework that 
produces case-specific outcomes and very few generalizable principles.  This 
fact-intensive judicial review is critically important because it maintains the 
states’ right to administer their own elections.  States retain the power to 
regulate elections and have an interest in administering secure, orderly 
elections.15  As indicated by the challenges the Anderson-Burdick balancing 
test has seen in its nearly three-decade history, the framework is particularly 
ill-equipped to handle disparate impact and “as-applied” claims.16 
This Note examines cases and trends in the 2020 election litigation that 
presented challenges to the principles of equity in the voting franchise, the 
 
Amendment); Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959) (finding 
that a North Carolina voter literacy test did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment); Giles v. 
Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903) (holding that Alabama’s voter registrars’ refusal to enfranchise 
more than five thousand Black male voters on the basis of race was within the state’s 
authority); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874) (upholding a Missouri court’s judgment 
that the U.S. Constitution does not confer the voting right to women). 
 13. See generally Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Election Litigation in the Time of the 
Pandemic, U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE (June 26, 2020), http://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2020/ 
06/26/pandemic-stephanopoulos/ [https://perma.cc/B3TQ-RWLE] (outlining three novel 
issues in a sliding-scale scrutiny analysis during the time of the pandemic, including:  (1) how 
to conceptualize burdens that are attributable to both state action and the pandemic;  
(2) whether to fault plaintiffs for not having taken precautionary steps before the pandemic 
hit; and (3) what weight to give the so-called “Purcell principle,” which frowns upon late-
breaking judicial changes to electoral rules); see also COVID-19 Related Litigation:  
Challenges to Election and Voting Practices During COVID-19 Pandemic, 54 A.L.R. Fed. 3d 
Art. 3 (2020) (providing a survey of COVID-19 litigation categorized by election 
administrative processes, e.g., “Remote voting or changes to such voting prohibited” and 
“Election delay or cancellation approved”); 2020 Election Litigation Tracker, SCOTUSBLOG, 
https://www.scotusblog.com/ 
election-litigation/ [https://perma.cc/G84F-XG6J] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021) (tracking 
up-to-date information on major election law cases of the 2020 election cycle). 
 14. “Each provision of a[n election] code, ‘whether it governs the registration and 
qualifications of voters, the selection and eligibility of candidates, or the voting process itself, 
inevitably affects—at least to some degree—the individual’s right to vote and his right to 
associate with others for political ends.’” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433 (quoting Anderson, 460 
U.S. at 788); see also id. at 434 (“There is no doubt that the Hawaii election laws, like all 
election regulations, have an impact on the right to vote.” (emphasis added)). 
 15. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 4, cl. 1; see also Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 
U.S. 181, 196 (2008). 
 16. See, e.g., Crawford, 553 U.S. at 216 (Souter, J., dissenting) (upholding an Indiana 
voter-ID law over plaintiffs’ disparate impact claims that “the travel costs and the fees are 
disproportionately heavy for, and thus disproportionately likely to deter, the poor, the old, and 
the immobile” in favor of the state’s interest in controlling voter fraud, despite not a single 
recorded instance of the type of voter fraud targeted). 
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authority of the states to regulate their own elections, and the role of 
intervention by the judicial branch to expand and protect voters’ rights.  Part 
I describes the primary legal doctrines and challenges that arose in the 2020 
election season in terms of the principles of state autonomy in conducting 
and regulating elections.  It continues by outlining equity-based challenges 
regarding accessing, expanding, and exercising the right to vote, and it 
concludes with a review of judicial intervention—including intervention 
under the Purcell principle—when the principles of state autonomy and voter 
equity are in tension.17 
Part II describes the Anderson-Burdick balancing test framework and 
considers its strengths and weaknesses in resolving the tensions that arise 
between state autonomy, equitable access to the vote, and judicial 
intervention in equal protection claims, particularly in interaction with the 
Purcell principle. 
Part III introduces and demonstrates the “Carolene test,”18 a novel 
approach to equal protection challenges in election administration cases that 
supplants the Purcell principle and instead centers evaluations of 
appropriateness of judicial intervention on expanding equity in the franchise.  
The Carolene test evaluates changes in access to the vote and determines 
whether judicial intervention is appropriate based on three factors:  (1) 
whether the change is a state action in election administration that relates to 
the ability to participate in the political process,19 (2) whether the change 
demonstrates prejudice against discrete and insular minorities,20 and (3) 
whether the change would expand or diminish the franchise. 
I.  AUTONOMY, EQUITY, AND INTERVENTION:  PRINCIPLES IN 2020 EQUAL 
PROTECTION ELECTIONS CHALLENGES 
This part outlines the legal authority behind equal protection voting rights 
claims in terms of three fundamental organizing principles.  Part I.A 
discusses the constitutionally granted autonomy of the states to administer 
and regulate their own individual elections for national office.  Part I.B 
discusses the principle of equity in expanding and protecting the franchise 
and introduces the Anderson-Burdick balancing test, which allows courts to 
remedy harms under the Equal Protection Clause when voting rights are 
infringed.  Part I.C outlines the principles governing judicial intervention in 
the elections context, including the Purcell principle.  This section describes 
the legal doctrines behind voting rights claims based in the Equal Protection 
Clause, structuring them around three organizing principles:  state 
legislatures’ autonomy to direct and administer the elections process; voters’ 
 
 17. The Purcell principle determines the appropriateness of judicial intervention, 
representing that federal courts should not issue orders which change election rules on the 
“eve of the election.” Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 6 (2006); see also Richard L. Hasen, 
Reining In the Purcell Principle, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 427, 428 (2016); see infra Part I.C.3. 
 18. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
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right to equity in access to, and exercise of, the franchise based in the 
Fourteenth Amendment; and the judicial intervention that ensues when state 
legislatures’ autonomy conflicts with equity in access to the vote. 
A.  Autonomy:  State Legislatures’ Authority to Act 
The U.S. Constitution grants broad authority to state legislatures to 
conduct and regulate nearly all aspects of federal elections through the 
Elections Clause and the Electors Clause.21  The Elections Clause delegates 
primary authority for determining the process for electing U.S. Senators and 
Representatives to each state legislature, stating in full:  “The Times, Places 
and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be 
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at 
any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of 
choosing Senators.”22 
The Elections Clause is the primary source of constitutional authority for 
states to regulate congressional elections.23  The Clause designates that the 
states determine the “Times, Places, and Manner” of congressional elections, 
subject to Congress’s authority to “make or alter” state regulations.24  It 
grants states the authority to enact an election code, including rules and 
regulations on voting procedures, voter registration, voter protection, fraud 
prevention, vote counting, and the determination of election results.25  
Generally, this clause stands for the principle that states hold the authority to 
determine the administration of their elections, and judicial review upholds a 
variety of state laws designed to ensure that elections—including federal 
elections—are fair, honest, and orderly.26 
State legislatures are further granted primary authority for selecting the 
U.S. president in the Electors Clause, which states: 
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may 
direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and 
Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress:  but no 
Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit 
under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.27 
 
 21. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 4, cl. 1; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
 22. Id. art. 1, § 4, cl. 1. 
 23. Michael T. Morley & Franita Tolson, Common Interpretation:  Elections Clause, 
NAT’L CONST. CTR., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/interpretation/ 
article-i/clauses/750 [https://perma.cc/4TKX-ZTZU] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021). 
 24. See id. 
 25. See id. 
 26. See, e.g., Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 196–98 (1986) (upholding 
a law requiring that minor party candidates demonstrate substantial support—one percent of 
votes cast in the primary election—before being placed on the ballot for the general election); 
Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736–39 (1974) (upholding restrictions on independent 
candidacies requiring early commitment prior to party primaries); Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 
U.S. 15, 25 (1972) (upholding a recount for a senatorial election). 
 27. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
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This clause outlines the unique American Electoral College system, by which 
states appoint electors to choose the president.  Congress determines the time 
of choosing electors and the day on which the electors all throughout the 
United States give their votes; otherwise, the states generally hold exclusive 
power and jurisdiction over the electoral vote for president.28  Originally 
imagined as a deliberative body that filtered public opinion as an intermediate 
institution, the Electoral College today generally allots votes to candidates 
who win popular vote totals in the individual states.29  Individual citizens 
hold “no federal constitutional right to vote for electors for the President of 
the United States unless and until the state legislature chooses a statewide 
election as the means to implement its power to appoint members of the 
electoral college.”30 
B.  Equity:  The Fourteenth Amendment’s Role in Expanding and 
Protecting the Right to Vote 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.31 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states 
from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property without due process 
of law.”32  Generally, challenges under the Due Process Clause in state 
election activities revolve around the question of whether a change or defect 
in the state’s election administration interferes with voters’ ability to exercise 
their right to vote, including ballot access issues that govern prospective 
candidates’ ability to appear on ballots.33  Federal courts have yet to agree on 
a standard for cases when major election irregularities lead to due process 
violations.34  However, many election-related due process violations relate 
to states changing or ignoring established election rules without sufficient 
justification or warning, or in a manner not anticipated by voters.35 
 
 28. See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 11 (1892). 
 29. James W. Ceaser & Jamin Raskin, Common Interpretation:  Article II, Section 1, 
Clauses 2 and 3, NAT’L CONST. CTR., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-
constitution/interpretation/article-ii/clauses/350 [https://perma.cc/PQY2-3WMH] (last visited 
Sept. 17, 2021). 
 30. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (“History has now favored the voter, and in 
each of the several States the citizens themselves vote for Presidential electors.  When the state 
legislature vests the right to vote for President in its people, the right to vote as the legislature 
has prescribed is fundamental; and one source of its fundamental nature lies in the equal 
weight accorded to each vote and the equal dignity owed to each voter.”). 
 31. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 32. See id. 
 33. Due Process and Election Administration, SCOTUSBLOG, 
https://www.scotusblog.com/educational-resources/due-process-and-election-administration/ 
[https://perma.cc/JJ8S-GLBD] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021). 
 34. See id. 
 35. See id. 
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The Equal Protection Clause prohibits the states from discriminating on 
the basis of race and other classifications; the Clause makes it unlawful to 
“deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection under the 
laws.”36  Where an election law—or any law—explicitly denies equal 
protection of the laws on the basis of race or national origin, it must be 
considered under strict scrutiny.37  Where other categories are implicated, or 
where the law merely levies a burden on some voters (or candidates), the 
court employs a sliding-scale doctrine known as the Anderson-Burdick 
balancing test.38 
1.  The Anderson-Burdick Balancing Test 
The Anderson-Burdick balancing test establishes a sliding scale of judicial 
scrutiny that weighs the burdens that a state law imposes on electoral 
participation against the state’s asserted interests or benefits.39  The greater 
the burden imposed, the greater the state interest must be to justify it.40  The 
doctrine is named after two U.S. Supreme Court precedents involving ballot 
access cases:  Anderson v. Celebrezze41 and Burdick v. Takushi.42  The test 
has been applied by the Supreme Court in resolving prominent voter 
identification controversies43 and by lower courts in a wide variety of 
election administration cases.44  Anderson-Burdick balancing has been used 
to handle timing issues in early voting, requirements for casting and counting 
provisional ballots, and the regulation of voting by mail.45  The Supreme 
Court has yet to narrow the wide possibilities for applying the balancing test, 
and the lower courts have been divided on how to assess burdens that various 
voting regulations and practices impose on voters.46 
 
 36. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Brian T. Fitzpatrick & Theodore M. Shaw,  
Common Interpretation:  The Equal Protection Clause, NAT’L CONST. CTR., 
https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/interpretation/amendment-
xiv/clauses/702 [https://perma.cc/4JG2-VG7R] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021). 
 37. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Fitzpatrick & Shaw, supra note 36. 
 38. The Anderson-Burdick Doctrine:  Balancing the Benefits and Burdens of Voting 
Restrictions, SCOTUSBLOG [hereinafter The Anderson-Burdick Doctrine], 
https://www.scotusblog.com/educational-resources/the-anderson-burdick-doctrine-
balancing-the-benefits-and-burdens-of-voting-restrictions/ [https://perma.cc/MK8B-MMPM] 
(last visited Sept. 17, 2021). 
 39. Id. 
 40. See id. 
 41. 460 U.S. 780 (1982). 
 42. 504 U.S. 428 (1992). 
 43. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 553 U.S. 181, 190–91 (2008) 
(applying Anderson-Burdick balancing to determine the constitutionality of a state law 
requiring a government-issued photo ID in order to vote under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 44. The Anderson-Burdick Doctrine, supra note 38. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See id. 
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2.  Problems with and Proposed Solutions for the Anderson-Burdick 
Balancing Test 
To determine the appropriate tier of judicial scrutiny required in a 
constitutional voting rights challenge, the Anderson-Burdick balancing test 
relies on complex multifactor balancing between the character and 
magnitude of a burden and the state’s precise interests in imposing that 
burden, considering the extent to which those interests make it necessary to 
burden the right to vote.47  Courts apply the Anderson-Burdick balancing test 
when evaluating burdens on citizens’ right to vote under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.48  The framework applies in murkier waters where 
the burdens on the right to vote do not categorically deny the franchise to a 
class of citizens based on “invidious” discrimination, which demands strict 
scrutiny and requires the state to present a narrowly tailored solution to a 
compelling government interest in order to be upheld.49  Unlike strict 
scrutiny and rational basis review, which are found throughout constitutional 
law, the Anderson-Burdick balancing test applies only to certain subsets of 
election laws that burden voting and associational rights.50 
In contrast to the traditional tiered scrutiny approach to judicial review, the 
Anderson-Burdick balancing test is a sliding scale that requires the court to 
balance:  (1) the character and magnitude of the burdens on the right to vote, 
(2) the state’s precise interests in imposing the burden, and (3) the extent to 
which those state interests make it necessary to burden the right to vote.51  
“[T]he rigorousness of [the court’s] inquiry into the propriety of a state 
election law depends upon the extent to which a challenged regulation 
burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.”52  Where the challenged 
law severely restricts the right to vote, the sliding scale tilts toward strict 
scrutiny, such that courts will require the election law be narrowly tailored to 
 
 47. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 428; Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1982) (“[A] 
court must resolve [a constitutional] challenge [to specific provisions of a state’s election laws] 
by an analytical process that parallels its work in ordinary litigation.  It must first consider the 
character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate.  It then must identify and evaluate 
the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its 
rule.  In passing judgment, the Court must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of 
each of those interests; it also must consider the extent to which those interests make it 
necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.  Only after weighing all these factors is the reviewing 
court in a position to decide whether the challenged provision is unconstitutional.”). 
 48. See, e.g., Crawford, 553 U.S. at 200–03 (upholding a voter-ID requirement); Wash. 
State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 452–58 (2008) (upholding a 
Washington law instituting top-two blanket primaries); Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 
591–92 (2005) (upholding an Oklahoma law allowing parties only closed or semiclosed 
primaries); Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 369–70 (1997) (upholding 
a Minnesota law prohibiting fusion candidacies). 
 49. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (holding strict scrutiny 
necessary to protect voting rights). 
 50. See Andrew C. Maxfield, Litigating the Line Drawers:  Why Courts Should Apply 
Anderson-Burdick to Redistricting Commissions, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 1845, 1863 (2020). 
 51. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434; Anderson, 460 U.S at 793–95. 
 52. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434. 
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serve a compelling state interest.53  If the challenged law “imposes only 
‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions’ upon the First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights of voters,” then courts may find that “‘the State’s 
important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify’ the 
restrictions.”54  But, “[h]owever slight” the burden on the right to vote “may 
appear,” “it must be justified by relevant and legitimate state interests 
‘sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation.’”55  This is a highly 
fact-specific determination.  Courts in the Ninth Circuit and across the 
country apply the Anderson-Burdick balancing test to similar “as-applied” 
disparate impact claims, yet produce strikingly contrary outcomes in their 
balancing.56 
C.  Intervention:  Oversight and Overreach in Judicial Intervention in 
Elections Administration 
This section introduces judicial oversight and judicial overreach, two 
opposing principles of judicial intervention which create tension in courts’ 
approach to election litigation. 
1.  Judicial Oversight of Elections 
Marbury v. Madison57 establishes the principle that it is the judiciary’s role 
“to say what the law is”58—a principle that extends to election law.59  Article 
III of the U.S. Constitution limits federal courts’ authority to the 
determination of “Cases” and “Controversies.”60  If there is no “case” or 
“controversy” of a nature that can be decided by the judiciary, or where the 
matter has been delegated to a political branch, or where the matter involves 
no judicially enforceable rights, the issue is nonjusticiable and the judicial 
branch cannot hear the claim.61 
2.  The Purcell Principle 
The so-called “Purcell principle” derives from Purcell v. Gonzalez,62 a 
case stemming from the 2006 midterm election, in which the Ninth Circuit 
blocked an Arizona voter-ID law until an appeal on the merits could be heard, 
in effect changing the rules for the November election.63  The Court in 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788). 
 55. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 191 (2008) (quoting Norman 
v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288–89 (1992)). 
 56. See infra Part II.A; see also infra Part II.A.2. 
 57. 5 U.S. 137 (1 Cranch) (1803). 
 58. Id. at 177. 
 59. See id.  See generally RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW:  
JUDGING EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE (2003). 
 60. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2493 (2019). 
 61. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277 (2004); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 
217 (1962). 
 62. 549 U.S. 1 (2006). 
 63. Id. at 6. 
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Purcell criticized the Ninth Circuit for issuing without reasoning an order 
that could interfere with election administration and stir voter confusion.64  
Generally, the Purcell principle indicates that federal courts should not issue 
orders that change election rules in the period just before an election.65  Since 
2006, courts have relied on the Purcell principle to block last-minute changes 
to election procedures, and the Supreme Court routinely employs it in its 
review of the flurry of emergency election cases that arise every presidential 
election cycle.66 
II.  JUDICIAL INTERVENTION TO PROMOTE EQUITY IN THE FRANCHISE  
Part II of this Note outlines the role courts played in the 2020 election as 
judicial intervention usurped state autonomy in the interest of protecting and 
promoting equity in the exercise of the right to vote. 
A.  Challenges Raised in the 2020 Election 
Part II.A examines the litigation raised in the 2020 election under the three 
organizing principles of autonomy, equity, and intervention.  Part II.A.1 
explores challenges to state legislatures’ autonomy.  Part II.A.1.a focuses on 
challenges to governors’ executive orders and emergency declarations.  Part 
II.A.1.b outlines litigation against state and local election officials.  Part 
II.A.1.c discusses litigation against the U.S. Postal Service.  Part II.A.1.d 
presents litigation based on perceived violations of legislative autonomy in 
election codes and statutes.  Part II.A.2 enumerates the challenges to voter 
equity brought under the Anderson-Burdick test.  Part II.A.3 explores the 
challenges brought against judicial intervention, including litigation 
involving court orders. 
1.  Autonomy:  Challenging Authority to Act 
In response to the pandemic, state governments across the United States 
enacted a slew of rules, regulations, policies, and orders to accommodate for 
the novel situation of administering an election during a pandemic.67  
Governors issued emergency declarations that directly or indirectly affected 
election administration, legislatures enacted new pandemic-era rules, 
secretaries of state and other designated election officials promulgated 
regulations, and state and federal courts issued orders and rulings.68  A 
 
 64. Id. at 4–5. 
 65. See Hasen, supra note 17, at 428. 
 66. See id. at 444–59. 
 67. See, e.g., State Action on Coronavirus (COVID-19), NAT’L CONF. OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-action-on-coronavirus-covid-
19.aspx [https://perma.cc/CLT7-BHDD] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021); State Government 
Responses to the Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic, 2020, BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/State_government_responses_to_the_coronavirus_(COVID-
19)_pandemic,_2020 [https://perma.cc/9J9C-3LXE] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021). 
 68. See generally Absentee and Mail Voting Policies in Effect for the 2020 Election, 
NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Nov. 3, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/ 
elections-and-campaigns/absentee-and-mail-voting-policies-in-effect-for-the-2020-
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significant number of the 2020 cases brought challenges to the government 
agencies responsible for new and existing election rules, on the grounds that 
the issuing body lacked the proper statutory, delegated, or constitutional 
authority to act.69  State legislatures have the constitutional authority to 
designate the time, place, and manner of administering elections.70  All fifty 
state legislatures have assigned some election rulemaking responsibilities to 
state or county executive-branch bodies, most commonly to secretaries of 
state, but also to state bodies called, for example, elections boards, divisions 
of elections, or boards of commissioners.71 
a.  Executive Orders 
Governors across the nation issued executive orders and emergency 
declarations in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, several of which had a 
substantial impact on how states conducted their elections.72 
Some lawsuits challenged executive orders made without a 
pandemic-related grant of increased executive power or an emergency 
declaration.  In Anti-Defamation League Austin, Southwest, and Texoma 
Regions v. Abbott,73 a group of nonprofit organizations, including 
Anti-Defamation League Austin and Common Cause Texas, challenged 
Texas Governor Greg Abbott’s proclamation prohibiting more than one 
mail-in ballot drop box per county, alleging that he had exceeded his 
authority by limiting in-person ballot drop-off locations.74  The challenge 
reached the Texas Supreme Court, which found the governor’s exercise of 
power permissible, reversed the Texas Court of Appeals, and lifted an 
injunction entered by the state trial court.75 
 
election.aspx [https://perma.cc/9JTM-7Q2U]; COVID-19 and 2020 Primary Elections, NAT’L 
CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (July 2, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-
campaigns/state-action-on-covid-19-and-elections.aspx [https://perma.cc/X3XR-A7AD]; 
Elections During COVID-19:  50-State Resources, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/covid-
19/50-state-covid-19-resources/elections-during-covid-19-50-state-resources/ 
[https://perma.cc/K3R6-MZGY] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021) (surveying state and federal 
governmental responses to COVID-19 during the 2020 election cycle, including voting 
procedures, voting dates, and modifications to ensure the safety of voters and poll workers). 
 69. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 70. See supra Part I.A. 
 71. See Election Administration at State and Local Levels, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES (Feb. 3, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/ 
election-administration-at-state-and-local-levels.aspx [https://perma.cc/2JT5-LCGR]. 
 72. See generally Executive Orders Issued by Governors and State Agencies in Response 
to the Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic, 2020, BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Executive_orders_issued_by_governors_and_state_agencies_in_respo
nse_to_the_coronavirus_(COVID-19)_pandemic,_2020 [https://perma.cc/TJJ9-7B46]  
(June 29, 2020) (cataloguing at least 2065 executive orders issued during the coronavirus 
pandemic by state and by subject, including those related to elections). 
 73. 610 S.W.3d 911 (Tex. 2020). 
 74. Id. at 914–15. 
 75. Id. at 923. 
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Another case, City of Green Bay v. Bostelmann,76 presented an unusual 
challenge in the Eastern District of Wisconsin:  the mayor and city clerk of 
the City of Green Bay, in their official capacities, challenged the authority of 
the Wisconsin governor, secretary-designee, and election committee after the 
state decided not to postpone the April 2020 primary election.77  The Green 
Bay city officials sought declaratory and injunctive relief that:  (1) permitted 
a primary delay until June, (2) extended the voter registration deadline, 
(3) provided relief from in-person and absentee voting requirements, (4) and 
allowed mail-in ballots to be sent to all registered voters.78  The district court 
dismissed the city officials’ claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
citing the “political subdivisions standing doctrine”79 and finding that the city 
officials lacked standing to bring federal constitutional claims in their official 
capacity because they are not “persons” within the meaning of the Due 
Process Clause.80 
In Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. Bullock,81 President Donald J. 
Trump for President, Inc. (“the Trump Campaign”) pursued a suit in the 
District of Montana against Montana Governor Steven Bullock and Secretary 
of State Corey Stapleton, alleging that the governor overstepped his authority 
and infringed on the role of the state legislature when he promulgated an 
executive order granting universal vote-by-mail balloting due to the 
pandemic.82  The case garnered a number of prominent intervenors, including 
the speaker of the Montana House of Representatives and the president of the 
Montana Senate in support of the Trump Campaign, as well as the Montana 
Democratic Party, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee 
(DCCC), and the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC) in 
support of the governor and secretary of state.83  A federal district court in 
the District of Montana considered the claim of executive overstep along with 
the plaintiffs’ other major claim:  that the governor’s system left Montana 
elections vulnerable to voter abuse and fraud.  The court ultimately denied 
the Trump Campaign’s request for injunctive relief.84  The court invoked the 
Purcell principle and concluded that the threat of mail-in voting fraud in 
Montana is a “fiction,” leaving in place the governor’s directive granting 
universal vote-by-mail for the state.85 
Similarly, the Trump Campaign challenged New Jersey Governor Philip 
Murphy’s authority to enact New Jersey Executive Order 177, which 
mandated holding an all-mail election, automatically distributing mail-in 
 
 76. No. 20-C-479, 2020 WL 1492975, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 27, 2020). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id.  The “political subdivisions standing doctrine” holds that a political subdivision of 
the state, like a municipality, may not sue the state of which it is a part in federal court. Id. 
 80. Id. at *2–3. 
 81. 491 F. Supp. 3d 814 (D. Mont. 2020). 
 82. Id. at 822–23. 
 83. Id. at 821. 
 84. Id. at 821–22. 
 85. Id. at 822. 
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ballots, and treating all in-person ballots as provisional.86  The executive 
order was later amended to further revise mail-in balloting procedures and 
add provisions requiring county boards of elections to establish ballot drop 
boxes in each county at least forty-five days before the general election.87  
The plaintiffs sought an injunction against the implementation of Executive 
Order 177, challenging the governor’s authority under the Elections Clause 
and Electors Clause of the U.S. Constitution.  They further argued that the 
order diluted the value of legitimate votes and violated in-person voters’ 
rights to vote safely and efficiently.88  A federal district court in the District 
of New Jersey denied the preliminary injunction and dismissed the claims for 
lack of standing and for relying on overly speculative assertions.89 
Some claims focused on the political impact of executive-branch responses 
to the pandemic, including the widespread restrictions on large gatherings 
many states enacted.  In Election Integrity Fund v. Whitmer,90 plaintiffs 
Election Integrity Fund and One Nation Michigan challenged Michigan 
Governor Gretchen Whitmer’s executive order prohibiting large gatherings 
on the basis that the order, which restricted their ability to hold political 
gatherings and rallies, violated the First Amendment’s guarantees of freedom 
of speech and assembly.91  They sought an injunction to prevent the state 
from arresting or prosecuting anyone on the basis of the executive order.92 
Similarly, in Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Walz,93 a group of voters and 
the Minnesota Voters Alliance sued Minnesota Governor Tim Walz and 
other officials, including Secretary of State Steve Simon, arguing that the 
prospect of being prosecuted for failing to wear a mask under the governor’s 
executive order chilled their First Amendment political and associational 
freedoms.  They further argued that the governor had overstepped his 
executive authority and encroached on the legislative role and that an 
executive order he had issued directly contradicted a legislatively enacted 
statute.94  A federal district court in the District of Minnesota found that the 
plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue state law claims, and the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals denied the application for an injunction pending appeal.95  
Plaintiffs then appealed to the Supreme Court, and Justice Gorsuch denied 
relief without comment.96 
Several states also saw a series of challenges to executive orders from the 
medical profession that had direct implications on the executive branch’s 
 
 86. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. Way, 492 F. Supp. 3d 354, 358 (D.N.J. 2020). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 363, 365. 
 89. Id. 
 90. No. 1:20-cv-805, 2020 WL 6605988 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 5, 2020). 
 91. Id., at *1.  The district court dismissed the case as moot after the Michigan Supreme 
Court ruled that Governor Whitmer’s executive orders lacked the force of law. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. 494 F. Supp. 3d 610 (D. Minn. 2020). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 613. 
 96. Minn. Voters All. v. Walz, No. 20A81 (U.S. Nov. 2, 2020) (Gorsuch, J.) (denial of 
application for injunctive relief pending appeal). 
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ability to intervene in the elections administration process.  One such 
challenge came in Midwest Institute of Health, PLLC v. Whitmer,97 a suit 
brought by several medical institutions and individual physicians against the 
governor and attorney general of Michigan.  The claims targeted the 
governor’s executive orders under the Emergency Powers of the Governor 
Act and the Emergency Management Act as violative of the 
separation-of-powers and nondelegation clauses, ultimately holding that the 
governor only had the authority to declare a single state of emergency that 
must terminate if the legislature does not grant an extension, and that the 
Emergency Powers of the Governor Act violated the Michigan Constitution 
by impermissibly delegating legislative authority to the executive branch.98 
b.  State and Local Elections Administrators 
Before the pandemic, only a handful of states mailed absentee ballot 
applications to all registered voters.  This year, in light of the pandemic, 
election administrators in a few states made unprecedented decisions to mail 
out absentee ballots to all registered voters.99  Jocelyn Benson, secretary of 
state of Michigan, made this change and saw a series of challenges from 
voters and candidates alike beginning in May 2020.100 
One prominent example was in North Carolina in Moore v. Circosta.101  
The plaintiffs were several North Carolina voters, candidates, members of 
the U.S. Congress, the Trump Campaign, the Republican National 
Committee, the National Republican Senatorial Committee, the National 
Republican Congressional Committee, and the North Carolina Republican 
Party.  They challenged the North Carolina State Board of Elections’ changes 
to the 2020 voting procedures made under a Settlement Act entered into with 
the North Carolina Alliance for Retired Americans.102  The changes 
effectively extended the absentee ballot receipt deadline, provided voters 
with notice and an opportunity to cure ballot defects after election day, 
allowed absentee ballots to be dropped off at early voting locations and 
 
 97. No. 1:20-CV-414, 2020 WL 3248785 (W.D. Mich. June 16, 2020), certified question 
accepted sub nom. In re Certified Questions from U.S. Dist. Ct., W. Dist. of Mich., S. Div., 
944 N.W.2d 911 (Mich. 2020) (mem.), and certified question answered sub nom. In re 
Certified Questions from U.S. Dist. Ct., W. Dist. of Mich., S. Div., 958 N.W.2d 1  
(Mich. 2020).  The case was removed to the Western District of Michigan. Id. 
 98. Id. at *2–3. 
 99. See, e.g., Absentee and Mail Voting Policies in Effect for the 2020 Election, supra 
note 68; Kate Rabinowitz & Brittany Renee Mayes, At Least 84% of American Voters Can 
Cast Ballots by Mail in the Fall, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/politics/vote-by-mail-states/ 
[https://perma.cc/SL7G-JX89]; Benjamin Swasey, Map:  Mail-In Voting Rules By State—And 
the Deadlines You Need, NPR (Oct. 14, 2020, 3:00 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/09/14/ 
909338758/map-mail-in-voting-rules-by-state [https://perma.cc/6G47-NZHZ]. 
 100. See, e.g., Cooper-Keel v. Benson, No. 20-000091-MM, 2020 WL 7033536, at *1 
(Mich. Ct. Cl. June 18, 2020). 
 101. 494 F. Supp. 3d 289, 297 (M.D.N.C. 2020), appeal dismissed sub nom. Wise v. 
Circosta, No. 20-2104 (L), 2021 WL 1511943 (4th Cir. Jan. 8, 2021), and appeal dismissed, 
No. 20-2107, 2021 WL 1511941 (4th Cir. Jan. 11, 2021). 
 102. Id. 
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county board offices, and did not reject ballots dropped off by third parties.103  
Plaintiffs asserted that these changes were outside the authority of the North 
Carolina State Board of Elections to regulate congressional and presidential 
elections in the state and further asserted that the changes would lead to 
increases in voter fraud.104 
The case reached a three-judge panel at the Fourth Circuit.105  Ultimately, 
the U.S. Supreme Court consolidated the case with other North Carolina 
cases in Moore v. Circosta,106 which had been brought by the speaker of the 
North Carolina House of Representatives, the president pro tempore of the 
North Carolina Senate, and several voters, against the chair and several 
officials of the North Carolina State Board of Elections for, among other 
things, alleged violations of the Elections Clause and Equal Protection 
Clause of the United States Constitution arising from changes in election 
policies intended to prevent the spread of COVID-19.107 
In Arizona Public Integrity Alliance, Inc. v. Adrian Fontes and Maricopa 
County,108 plaintiffs challenged Maricopa County, Arizona County Clerk 
Adrian Fontes’s decision to include an instruction on Maricopa County’s 
general election early ballots that would instruct voters to correct any 
mistaken votes by striking the incorrect vote and filling in the oval next to 
their preferred candidate choice.109  Plaintiffs argued that Fontes lacked the 
authority to give this instruction because it contradicted an Arizona state 
law.110  The Arizona Supreme Court agreed, ruling that Fontes was not 
authorized to instruct voters to correct ballots simply by striking out prior 
selections.111 
Likewise, several candidates for public office in Pennsylvania sought a 
temporary restraining order against the Allegheny County Board of Elections 
and county elections officials, challenging their treatment of certain revised 
mail-in ballots during the review and inspection process as taking over the 
powers of the Pennsylvania legislature to determine election procedures.112  
A district court in the Western District of Pennsylvania denied the request for 
a temporary restraining order and supported a consent decree establishing 
procedures for the Allegheny County Board of Elections to handle ballots 
from voters who were initially sent incorrect ballots.113 
Further, state legislatures across the country struggled to convene and 
maintain their sessions throughout the pandemic.  In State ex rel. Speweik v. 
 
 103. See id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Moore v. Circosta, 978 F.3d 93 (4th Cir. 2020). 
 106. 141 S. Ct. 46 (2020). 
 107. Id. 
 108. 475 P.3d 303, 305 (Ariz. 2020). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 305–06. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Parnell v. Allegheny Cnty. Bd. of Elections, No. 2:20-CV-1570, 2020 WL 6276845, 
at *1 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 26, 2020). 
 113. Id. 
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Wood County Board of Elections,114 a candidate challenged a decision from 
the Wood County Board of Elections and Ohio Secretary of State Frank 
LaRose to change the primary date from March 17, 2020, when the Ohio 
legislature had not elected to move the primary date despite knowing of the 
onset of the pandemic crisis.115  The plaintiff pursued a writ of mandamus on 
a theory of executive overstep and a fundamental violation of the “bedrock 
separation of powers” as necessary to avoid “chaos” and “clear violation of 
the election laws.”116  The chief justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio 
considered the complaint on an expedited basis and denied the writ of 
mandamus.117  Likewise, in Bailey v. South Carolina State Election 
Commission,118 several Democratic primary candidates, the South Carolina 
Democratic Party, and the DCCC urged the South Carolina Supreme Court 
to interpret an existing South Carolina law that allowed absentee voting for 
physically disabled persons to apply temporarily to all registered South 
Carolina voters, in light of the pandemic.119  The South Carolina Supreme 
Court dismissed the case as moot; it saw clear legislative intent in the fact 
that the state legislature had already enacted a law permitting all voters to 
vote absentee in the June primary but not in the November general 
election.120 
Minnesota Secretary of State Steve Simon entered a consent decree with 
the Minnesota Alliance for Retired Americans Education Fund to not enforce 
Minnesota’s statutorily mandated absentee ballot receipt deadline and to 
instead allow the counting of all ballots postmarked before November 3 and 
received within one week of election day.121  Several voters and electors 
sought to enjoin the consent decree, alleging that the secretary of state lacked 
authority to enter it and that it conflicted with state law, federal law, and the 
U.S. Constitution.122  A court in the District of Minnesota refused to grant 
the injunction.123  Voters and electors appealed, with the Republican Party 
of Minnesota as intervenor, to a three-judge panel of the Eighth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, which granted the preliminary injunction and blocked 
Minnesota’s absentee ballot receipt deadline extension.124 
Iowa Secretary of State Paul Pate faced challenges from both Republicans 
and Democrats after he issued a directive ordering county auditors to send 
blank absentee ballot applications to all households, although three county 
 
 114. 141 N.E.3d 253 (Ohio 2020) (unpublished table decision). 
 115. Verified Complaint at 1–2, State ex rel. Speweik v. Wood Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 141 
N.E.3d 253 (Ohio 2020). 
 116. Id. at 2. 
 117. Speweik, 141 N.E.3d at 253. 
 118. 844 S.E.2d 390 (S.C. 2020). 
 119. Id. at 391.  The plaintiffs sought this extension for both the June primaries and the 
November general election. Id. 
 120. Id. at 393. 
 121. Carson v. Simon, 494 F. Supp. 3d 589, 592 (D. Minn. 2020), rev’d and remanded, 
978 F.3d 1051 (8th Cir. 2020). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Carson v. Simon, 978 F.3d 1051, 1062–63 (8th Cir. 2020). 
2021] JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN ELECTIONS 1009 
auditors had already begun to send out prefilled absentee ballot applications 
in efforts to promote valid ballot requests and reduce administrative 
burdens.125  The Republican National Committee filed lawsuits against all 
three county auditors who had sent out prefilled absentee ballot applications, 
seeking a temporary injunction ordering the auditors to follow the secretary 
of state’s directive.126  After attempting to intervene in these suits and being 
denied, the Iowa Democratic Party, along with the DCCC and the DSCC, 
brought a claim against Iowa Secretary of State Paul Pate.127  After the lower 
court issued a stay on the secretary of state’s directive,128 the secretary of 
state appealed to the Iowa Supreme Court.  The high court found that not 
only did Secretary Pate act within proper statutory authority but further that 
the lower court improperly intervened in violation of the Purcell principle.129   
The Democratic parties requested judicial review of the agency action and 
challenged the secretary of state’s authority to act on separation-of-powers 
grounds, urging that the directive interfered with the counties’ “home rule”130 
and Iowans’ right to vote.131  The DSCC, DCCC, and Iowa Democratic Party 
concurrently filed another suit regarding how county auditors respond when 
they receive a defective absentee ballot request with incorrect or missing 
identification information.  The case ultimately reached the Iowa Supreme 
Court, consolidated with League of United Latin American Citizens of Iowa 
v. Pate,132 and with intervenors for the defendant, including the Trump 
Campaign, the National Republican Senatorial Committee, the National 
Republican Congressional Committee, and the Republican Party of Iowa.133  
This case, known as Pate II, focused on the Iowa secretary of state’s alleged 
lack of authorization to impose, enforce, and implement official guidance for 
ballot drop box restrictions, urging that promulgating regulations constitutes 
agency action and, as such, would be regulated under Iowa law, which 
allegedly did not comport with the secretary of state’s guidance.134  On this 
second challenge, the Iowa Supreme Court found that the case was largely 
resolved by the findings in Pate I and declined to set aside the state law for 
the purposes of the 2020 election.135 
 
 125. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm. v. Pate (Pate I), 950 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 
2020). 
 126. See Complaint at 11, Pate I, 950 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2020). 
 127. Id. 
 128. DSCC, DCCC, and the Iowa Democratic Party v. Pate, No. CVCV060642 (Iowa Dist. 
Ct. for Polk Cnty. Oct. 5, 2020), https://electionlawblog.org/wp-content/uploads/IA-DSCC-
20201005-decision.pdf [https://perma.cc/7T8Y-75ZT]. 
 129. See Pate I, 950 N.W.2d at 6–8. 
 130. See id. at 5.  Iowa’s constitution provides counties “home rule power and authority, 
not inconsistent with the laws of the general assembly,” such that they are granted the 
prevailing authority to determine their local affairs and government. IOWA CONST. art. III, 
§ 39a. 
 131. See Pate I, 950 N.W.2d at 7. 
 132. 950 N.W.2d 204 (Iowa 2020). 
 133. Id. at 206–07. 
 134. Id. at 208–13. 
 135. Id. at 207. 
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Similarly, in In re Hotze,136 the Texas Supreme Court considered whether 
the Harris County clerk overstepped his powers, designated under the Texas 
Election Code, by sending applications for mail-in ballots to over 2.37 
million registered voters in Harris County, regardless of whether the 
individual had a “disability” as defined in the Texas Election Code.137  The 
Texas Supreme Court saw a related matter in State v. Hollins,138 which 
queried whether the Harris County clerk had the power to send out an 
unsolicited mass mailing of ballots, where the Texas Election Code limits 
voting by mail to certain groups and establishes statutory eligibility 
requirements.139  While the trial and appellate courts denied the Texas 
attorney general’s request for a temporary restraining order on behalf of the 
State of Texas,140 the Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding 
that the Texas Election Code does not authorize a county clerk to exercise 
the authority to send mail-in ballots to voters who have not requested one.141 
Courts also saw challenges to new and existing regulations for poll 
watchers, including their level of access during the 2020 pandemic.  In Trump 
v. Philadelphia County Board of Elections,142 the Trump Campaign asserted 
a purported right for its campaign representatives to observe Philadelphia’s 
on-site satellite early voting locations as poll watchers, citing Pennsylvania 
statutory authority.143  The Trump Campaign also sued Pennsylvania 
Secretary of State Kathy Boockvar, asserting that insufficient poll watching 
and failure to “undertake[] any meaningful effort to prevent the casting of 
illegal or unreliable absentee or mail-in ballots” violated the Elections 
Clause.144 
c.  The United States Postal Service 
Given the unprecedented nationwide participation in voting by mail, this 
election cycle brought a new degree of attention to the political role of the 
U.S. Postal Service (USPS) and its authority to enact changes that affect 
elections administration.  In Pennsylvania v. DeJoy,145 seven states sued 
Louis DeJoy, in his official capacity as postmaster general of the United 
States, along with the chairman of the Board of Governors of the United 
 
 136. No. 20-0739, 2020 WL 5919726 (Tex. Oct. 7, 2020). 
 137. Id. at *1.  The Texas Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus. Id. at *3. 
 138. 620 S.W.3d 400 (Tex. 2020). 
 139. Id. at 403. 
 140. See id. at 405. 
 141. Id. at 410. 
 142. 241 A.3d 120 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2020) (unpublished table decision). 
 143. Id. at *2 (noting that the Trump Campaign requested that the court order defendants 
“to ‘permit representatives of the Campaign to enter and remain in the satellite election offices 
to serve as a [sic] watchers pursuant to 25 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 2650 and 2687’ of the Election 
Code of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania” (quoting plaintiff’s proposed order)). 
 144. Verified Second Amended and Supplemental Complaint for Declaratory and 
Injunctive Relief at 48, Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. Boockvar, 493 F. Supp. 3d 331 
(W.D. Pa. 2020) (No. 2:20-cv-00966-NR). 
 145. 490 F. Supp. 3d 833 (E.D. Pa. 2020), order clarified, No. CV 20-4096, 2020 WL 
6580462 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 9, 2020). 
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States Postal Service and the agency itself.146  The states challenged a series 
of election-time changes to USPS internal policies that resulted in mailing 
delays, with impacts on the election, including:  (1) prohibiting late or extra 
trips by postal workers, (2) requiring carriers to adhere to rigid start and stop 
times, (3) limiting postal workers’ overtime, (4) no longer automatically 
treating election mail as first-class mail, and (5) no longer delivering first 
class mail regardless of whether it has sufficient postage.147  A federal district 
court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that the postmaster’s 
policy changes violated federal statutes and subsequently issued a nationwide 
injunction on these policies.148 
Similarly, in New York v. Trump,149 plaintiffs New York State, New York 
City, Hawaii, New Jersey, and the City and County of San Francisco sued 
President Donald J. Trump, the USPS, and Postmaster General DeJoy in a 
district court in the District of Columbia for a slate of USPS policy changes 
including:  (1) removing collection boxes and sorting machines, (2) cutting 
overtime, (3) prohibiting late and extra trips, (4) a pilot program in nearly 
400 localities that disrupted regular mail service; and (5) no longer 
automatically treating election mail as first-class mail.150  After these 
changes were enacted, forty-six states sent a joint letter indicating that the 
new policies would seriously impact the timely delivery of mail-in ballots in 
the general election.151  The states alleged that the USPS and Postmaster 
General DeJoy’s policy changes overstepped their authority and harmed 
states’, counties’, and cities’ sovereign, quasi-sovereign, economic, and 
proprietary interests—including the ability to administer their elections and 
conduct government functions.152  The district court granted the plaintiffs’ 
motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the plaintiffs demonstrated 
that the USPS policies had a meaningful impact on mail service and 
established a likelihood of irreparable harm in their ability to combat the 
spread of COVID-19 and provide safe alternatives to in-person voting.153 
d.  Election Codes and Statutes 
This election cycle also brought some interesting challenges to new and 
existing election laws.  In Common Cause Indiana v. Lawson,154 the 
nonprofit group Common Cause Indiana brought a claim against Indiana 
election officials seeking injunctions of three 2019 Indiana election 
 
 146. Id. at 844. 
 147. Id. at 844–53. 
 148. Id. at 893. 
 149. 490 F. Supp. 3d 225 (D.D.C. 2020), order clarified, No. 20-CV-2340, 2020 WL 
6572675 (D.D.C. Oct. 22, 2020), appeal dismissed, No. 20-5352, 2021 WL 672390 (D.C. Cir. 
Feb. 10, 2021), and appeal dismissed, No. 20-5352, 2021 WL 672390 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 10, 
2021). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See id. 
 153. Id. at 242–45. 
 154. 488 F. Supp. 3d 724 (S.D. Ind. 2020), rev’d, 978 F.3d 1036 (7th Cir. 2020). 
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statutes.155  The three statutes substantially narrowed Indiana election laws 
to:  (1) bar Indiana courts from hearing any lawsuits regarding voter 
disenfranchisement and polling practices brought by voters, political parties, 
candidates for public office, public interest groups, or any other entity other 
than a county election board; (2) provide standing to only county election 
boards to bring lawsuits for voter disenfranchisement and, further, requiring 
unanimous approval by a county election board before bringing such a 
lawsuit; and (3) limit lawsuits regarding polling station irregularities to only 
those regarding shortened polling hours.156  A district court in the Southern 
District of Indiana enjoined the implementation, enforcement, and 
administration of all three statutes, finding that all three failed an 
Anderson-Burdick balancing test analysis and impermissibly burden the 
fundamental right to vote.157  However, a three-judge panel of the Seventh 
Circuit found that the district court had incorrectly assessed the burden on 
the right to vote and stayed the injunction, citing the Purcell principle.158 
In contrast, in Republican State Committee of Delaware v. State of 
Delaware Department of Elections,159 plaintiffs sought declaratory and 
injunctive relief in the Delaware Chancery Court blocking a new Delaware 
law that allowed all voters to vote absentee, regardless of their reason, on the 
grounds that it violated the Delaware Constitution’s limited permissible 
reasons for voting absentee and that universal absentee voting allegedly 
increased fraud.160 
2.  Vote Equity:  Challenging Burdens on Access to the Vote 
Challenges to vote equity represented a limited but critically important 
world of cases in the 2020 election cycle.  No fewer than twenty-seven 
prominent voting rights challenges in the United States applied an 
Anderson-Burdick balancing test as the U.S. Supreme Court and state and 
federal courts in Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, 
Iowa, Michigan, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia considered burdens on the right to vote in the 
context of the COVID-19 pandemic.161 
 
 155. Id. at 728. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 731–32.  One statute targeted standing to challenge the changes, limiting eligible 
litigants to just county election boards who unanimously voted to file suit. See IND. CODE 
§ 3-11.7-7-2 (2020) (ruled unconstitutional).  Another targeted remedies, requiring a court to 
produce a number of evidentiary and other findings before it could issue an order changing 
the new polling hours. See id. § 3-11.7-7-3 (ruled unconstitutional).  The third statute limited 
the duration of a court extension and allowed only certain polling places to be eligible for the 
extension. See id. § 3-11.7-7-4 (ruled unconstitutional). 
 158. Common Cause Ind. v. Lawson, 978 F.3d 1036, 1043 (7th Cir. 2020). 
 159. 250 A.3d 911 (Del. Ch. 2020). 
 160. Id. at 915, 917. 
 161. See COVID-Related Election Litigation Tracker, STANFORD-MIT HEALTHY 
ELECTIONS PROJECT, https://healthyelections-case-tracker.stanford.edu/ [https://perma.cc/ 
ZS6G-DR2L] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021) (analyzing more than 600 election law cases arising 
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Several voting rights claimants prevailed.  In People First of Alabama v. 
Merrill,162 four registered voters at higher risk for severe complications from 
COVID-19 due to age, race, or underlying medical conditions filed a suit 
against the State of Alabama, its governor, and its secretary of state (among 
others) challenging Alabama’s voter-ID requirement, two-witness signature 
requirement, and de facto banning of curbside voting as violating the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments.163  Plaintiffs produced evidence that these 
requirements burden voters over the age of sixty-five and disproportionately 
burden Black voters and voters with disabilities.164  A federal court in the 
Northern District of Alabama granted plaintiffs’ request for a stay on the 
substantial likelihood that they would prevail on the merits of their challenge 
to the signature requirements, also supporting the curbside voting claim as it 
comported with the Americans with Disabilities Act standard.165 
Likewise, in Frederick v. Lawson,166 plaintiffs successfully challenged the 
constitutionality of Indiana’s absentee ballot signature matching 
determinations using the Anderson-Burdick balancing test.  The plaintiffs 
established a significant burden where voters were erroneously deprived of 
the right to vote without notice or opportunity to cure deficiencies, even 
though the errors affected only a few people.167  Critical to the determination 
was that the burden on voters’ exercise of the right to vote outweighed the 
state’s interests in fraud prevention and electoral integrity—two state 
interests that typically outweigh voter interests under Anderson-Burdick 
balancing.168 
However, these results were certainly not uniform.  In Common Cause 
Indiana, Common Cause Indiana sued the Indiana secretary of state, Indiana 
Election Commission, Indiana Election Division, and county officials over a 
set of election laws, claiming that the laws violate the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution by:  (1) removing voters’ standing to 
seek the extension of polling hours at polling locations where they have been 
disenfranchised; (2) limiting claims challenging some types of voting 
irregularities and providing no redress at all for others;169 (3) requiring a 
unanimous vote of “the entire membership” of a county board to change 
polling station hours, thus providing no means for a polling location’s hours 
to be extended if even a single member of a relevant county board is absent, 
 
out of the COVID-19 pandemic in more than forty-six states, the District of Columbia, and 
Puerto Rico). 
 162. 467 F. Supp. 3d 1179 (N.D. Ala. 2020), appeal dismissed, No. 20-12184, 2020 WL 
5543717 (11th Cir. July 17, 2020). 
 163. Id. at 1192. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. 481 F. Supp. 3d 774 (S.D. Ind. 2020). 
 167. Id. at 779. 
 168. See id. at 799. 
 169. These laws limited claims of voting irregularities to only those regarding late openings 
and closings of polling stations. Id. at 728.  Further, they provided no redress for other polling 
station irregularities, such as malfunctioning equipment or voting machines, insufficient 
ballots, or extraordinarily long wait times. Id. 
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unreachable, or unwilling to protect constituents’ fundamental right to vote; 
and (4) disenfranchising voters with no legitimate state interest in the changes 
effected by the 2019 amendments neither individually nor in their combined 
effect.170  A federal court in the Southern District of Indiana applied the 
Anderson-Burdick balancing test and enjoined all the Indiana statutes at 
issue, determining that they impermissibly burdened the right to vote.171 
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s injunction 
extending the Indiana poll hours.172  In a per curiam decision authored by 
Judge Frank Easterbrook, the Seventh Circuit rejected the district court’s 
Anderson-Burdick balancing test analysis, finding that “[t]he district court 
rested its conclusion that the amendments burdened the right to vote on the 
possibility that some imaginable circumstance exists in which those 
[statutory] provisions might affect voters.”173  Furthermore, the Seventh 
Circuit construed the plaintiffs’ claim that the amendments burden Indiana 
citizens’ right to vote as “a private right of action to enforce the 
amendments,” noting that “[t]hese amendments do not place a burden on the 
right to vote” and that “the justifications the defendants offer in their support 
stand to reason.”174  Absent a burden, the Seventh Circuit stayed the 
injunction, further citing the Purcell principle.175 
In Anderson v. Raffensperger,176 the Democratic Party of Georgia, the 
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, and three Georgia residents 
challenged local election administration policies that resulted in extended 
wait times at the polls, arguing that the wait times deterred citizens from 
voting and asserted undue burdens on the right to vote under the 
Anderson-Burdick balancing test.177  The court denied the plaintiffs’ request 
for a preliminary injunction on standing grounds, asserting that plaintiffs’ 
evidence of the likelihood of long lines in November was merely speculative 
and did not amount to an injury in fact.178 
Further, in Nemes v. Bensinger,179 a group of Kentucky voters failed to 
show that the state’s reduced number of polling places unconstitutionally 
burdened Black voters in several Kentucky counties.180  A federal district 
court in the Western District of Kentucky considered a series of asserted 
disproportionate burdens on Black voters, including high rates of underlying 
health circumstances that would raise risks of contracting COVID-19,181 
disproportionately long lines at certain polls predominantly serving Black 
 
 170. Id. 
 171. See id. 
 172. See Common Cause Ind. v. Lawson, 978 F.3d 1036, 1043 (7th Cir. 2020). 
 173. Id. at 1040. 
 174. Id. at 1040–41. 
 175. See id. at 1042–43; see also infra Part III.A.3.b. 
 176. 497 F. Supp. 3d 1300 (N.D. Ga. 2020). 
 177. Id. at 1303–05. 
 178. Id. at 1306–30. 
 179. 467 F. Supp. 3d 509 (W.D. Ky. 2020). 
 180. Id. at 515. 
 181. Id. at 531–32. 
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voters,182 and individual polling locations that caused a discriminatory 
impact on Black voters.183  However, these arguments failed the 
Anderson-Burdick balancing test,184 and the district court found that these 
conditions imposed no more than a modest burden on the right to vote and 
that Kentucky’s “substantial government interests” were sufficiently weighty 
to justify this modest burden.185 
3.  Intervention 
This section discusses challenges to judicial intervention in election 
cases themselves, first discussing cases that probed the legal basis and 
appropriateness of court orders in the election context and then discussing 
cases that weighed the Purcell principle against Anderson-Burdick 
balancing. 
a.  Court Orders 
Many litigants in election cases sought permanent injunctions, which 
require election administrators to take or cease particular actions in order to 
prevent possible injustice and irreparable harm that could not otherwise be 
remedied with damages.186  Since election litigation moves quickly in the 
time-pressured weeks and days before an election, lower courts often issue 
preliminary rulings in the form of preliminary injunctions and temporary 
restraining orders.187  Courts issue a preliminary injunction when a party 
shows in a hearing that it will suffer irreparable harm unless the injunction is 
issued.188  The appropriateness of a preliminary injunction is determined by 
meeting all four factors of the U.S. Supreme Court’s test established in 
Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,189 which considers:  (1) 
whether the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of the claim, (2) 
whether the plaintiff is likely to suffer irreparable harm without the 
injunction, (3) whether the balance of equities and hardships is in the 
plaintiff’s favor, and (4) whether an injunction is in the public interest.190  
Similarly, federal courts grant temporary restraining orders, or fourteen-day 
renewable injunctions, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b) via 
a two-part test that considers (1) whether immediate and irreparable injury 
 
 182. Id. at 531. 
 183. Id. at 525–29. 
 184. See id. at 524–29. 
 185. Id. at 529. 
 186. See generally Injunction, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/ 
injunction [https://perma.cc/25JT-MVNV] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021); see also infra Part II. 
 187. Amy Howe, Emergency Appeals:  Stay Requests, SCOTUSBLOG, 
https://www.scotusblog.com/educational-resources/emergency-appeals-stay-requests/ 
[https://perma.cc/F6SQ-2Q7Y] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021). 
 188. In federal court, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 governs. See Preliminary 
Injunction, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/preliminary_injunction 
[https://perma.cc/KMN5-769D] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021); FED. R. CIV. P. 65. 
 189. 555 U.S. 7 (2008). 
 190. See id. at 20. 
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will result before the adverse party can be heard and (2) what efforts, if any, 
have been made to give the notice and the reasons supporting the claim that 
notice should not be required.191 
In 2020, the most prominent challenge to court authority came in 
Pennsylvania Democratic Party v. Boockvar.192  The Republican Party of 
Pennsylvania pursued a challenge to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 
authority to order the state to count mail-in ballots received up to three days 
after Election Day.193  A federal district court in the Western District of 
Pennsylvania found that, although plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the 
claim that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s ballot deadline extension 
violated the Equal Protection Clause, the Purcell principle mandated that no 
injunction be awarded.194  The challenge went up to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
but was ultimately dismissed for mootness in April 2021.195 
b.  The Purcell Principle in Conflict with the Anderson-Burdick Balancing 
Test 
Several Anderson-Burdick balancing test claims were struck down under 
the Purcell principle, including claims of burdens on the right to vote that 
would otherwise have prevailed and have been found unconstitutional under 
the Anderson-Burdick balancing test.  In Republican National Committee v. 
Democratic National Committee196 (previously known as Democratic 
National Committee v. Bostelmann197), a Wisconsin district court granted a 
temporary restraining order that allowed extension of the deadline for request 
and receipt of absentee ballots,198 but the U.S. Supreme Court found in a  
5–4 decision that this extension violated the Purcell principle.199  Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissent, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, 
and Kagan, noting the district court’s Anderson-Burdick analysis and finding 
the Court’s intervention “ill advised, especially so at this late hour.”200  The 
dissent urged that “[t]he concerns advanced by the Court and the applicants 
pale in comparison to the risk that tens of thousands of voters will be 
disenfranchised.”201  The dissent’s fundamental divergence from the 
majority rests on the appropriateness of relying on the Purcell principle, 
stating instead, “Ensuring an opportunity for the people of Wisconsin to 
exercise their votes should be our paramount concern . . . .  The question here 
 
 191. FED. R. CIV. P. 65; Temporary Restraining Orders, LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/temporary_restraining_order [https://perma.cc/K58Q-
8ZJL] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021). 
 192. 238 A.3d 345 (Pa. 2020). 
 193. Id. at 352–355 
 194. Bognet v. Boockvar, No. 3:20-cv-00215, 2020 WL 6323121 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2020). 
 195. Bognet v. Degraffenreid, 141 S. Ct. 2508 (2021) (mem.). 
 196. 140 S. Ct. 1205 (2020) (per curiam). 
 197. 451 F. Supp. 3d 952 (W.D. Wis. 2020). 
 198. Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1206–07. 
 199. Id. at 1206–08. 
 200. Id. at 1208 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 201. Id. at 1211. 
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is whether tens of thousands of Wisconsin citizens can vote safely in the 
midst of a pandemic.”202 
Similarly, the Purcell principle defeated an Anderson-Burdick claim in A. 
Philip Randolph Institute of Ohio v. LaRose.203  Plaintiffs challenged Ohio 
Secretary of State Frank LaRose’s restriction on Ohio absentee voters’ ballot 
drop-off locations to just a single secure drop box location per county, 
seeking temporary and permanent injunctions allowing installation of more 
drop-off locations per county and allowing voters to return absentee ballot 
applications and ballots to any polling place at which they may vote.204  
While a district court in the Northern District of Ohio applied the 
Anderson-Burdick balancing test and found that the secretary’s guideline did 
not even meet rational basis review,205 the Sixth Circuit stayed the lower 
court’s ruling pending appeal, citing the Purcell principle.206 
B.  Legal Solutions to the Inconsistencies of the Anderson-Burdick 
Balancing Test 
The 2020 election cycle presented a limited but evolving world of cases 
that demonstrated the inconsistencies produced by the high level of judicial 
scrutiny involved in the Anderson-Burdick balancing test.207  The politically 
supercharged 2020 election cycle and the staggering administrative 
challenges presented by the pandemic resulted in a renewed call from the 
legal community to reconsider the underlying doctrine of the 
Anderson-Burdick balancing test.208  Legal scholars have proposed a number 
 
 202. Id. 
 203. 831 F. App’x 188 (6th Cir. 2020). 
 204. Id. at 190. 
 205. A. Philip Randolph Inst. of Ohio v. LaRose, 493 F. Supp. 3d 596, 600 (N.D. Ohio 
2020), appeal dismissed, No. 20-4063, 2020 WL 7980224 (6th Cir. Oct. 28, 2020). 
 206. LaRose, 831 F. App’x at 190 (stating that while “lower federal courts should ordinarily 
not alter election rules on the eve of an election[,] [h]ere, the district court went a step further 
and altered election rules during an election” (internal citation omitted)); see also Hasen, 
supra note 17 (advocating that the Purcell principle in emergency stays should be understood 
not as a stand-alone rule, but as one factor in the public-interest consideration prong). 
 207. See supra Part II.A.  Surrounding the November 2020 election, no fewer than 
twenty-seven prominent voting rights challenges in the United States apply an 
Anderson-Burdick framework analysis as the U.S. Supreme Court and state and federal courts 
in Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, New 
Hampshire, New York, Ohio, South Carolina Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia consider 
burdens on the right to vote in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. See COVID-Related 
Election Litigation Tracker, supra note 161 (analyzing over 600 election law cases arising out 
of the COVID-19 pandemic in more than forty-four states). 
 208. See, e.g., Daniel Bruce, Is It Time for SCOTUS to Revisit the Anderson-Burdick Test?:  
Insights from the Challenge to West Virginia’s Ballot Order Statute, STATE OF ELECTIONS:  
WM. & MARY L. SCH. (Nov. 18, 2020), http://electls.blogs.wm.edu/2020/11/18/time-scotus-
revisit-anderson-burdick-test-insights-challenge-west-virginias-ballot-order-statute/ 
[https://perma.cc/4MJG-8YU7]; Edward B. Foley, The Coming Supreme Court Showdown 
That May Affect How You Vote, FULCRUM (Oct. 23, 2020), https://thefulcrum.us/election-
dissection/election-case-in-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/95RP-PPXV] (discussing the 
Anderson-Burdick balancing test as a “collision of two tectonic plates . . . causing an 
earthquake in federal jurisprudence on absentee voting”); Richard L. Hasen, Three 
Pathologies of American Voting Rights Illuminated by the COVID-19 Pandemic, and How to 
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of resolutions to the perceived weaknesses in the framework of the 
Anderson-Burdick balancing test, including a return to the strict scrutiny 
regime (discussed in Part II.B.1), the Democracy Canon (discussed in Part 
II.B.2), and the Political Outcome test (discussed in Part II.B.3). 
1.  A Return to Strict Scrutiny 
Several scholars have proposed abandoning the Anderson-Burdick 
balancing test and returning to strict scrutiny as applied in Harper v. Virginia 
State Board of Elections.209  In equal protection voting rights claims, this 
would require the application of strict scrutiny whenever a statute or policy 
infringes a citizen’s right to vote, especially when there may be a 
discriminatory motivation behind the state regulation; there would be no 
balancing of the state’s administrative or regulatory interest.210  Anderson 
did not explicitly overrule Harper, and returning to the Harper strict scrutiny 
standard would realign the jurisprudence around discrimination in voting 
rights with other constitutionally recognized fundamental rights.211  
However, while a return to strict scrutiny would certainly raise the bar for 
election laws that burden voters’ ability to access and exercise the franchise, 
it lacks the flexibility that became so important in achieving success under 
the Anderson-Burdick balancing test during the pandemic.212  The rapidly 
changing context of the pandemic made clear that an ordinarily minor burden 
on voters, such as returning absentee ballots by a deadline, can become a 
severe and extremely onerous one.213 
2.  The Democracy Canon 
Courts have also applied the “Democracy Canon,” as developed by 
Richard L. Hasen.214  Generally, the Democracy Canon is a substantive 
canon of statutory interpretation that promotes an interpretation in favor of 
 
Treat and Cure Them, 19 ELECTION L.J. 263, 264 (2020), https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/pdf/ 
10.1089/elj.2020.0646 [https://perma.cc/EE96-KGW2] (praising the Anderson-Burdick 
balancing test’s flexibility, but describing it as “an uncertain balancing test” that offers only 
“weak” and “ad hoc protection of voting rights through constitutional adjudication”). 
 209. 383 U.S. 663, 667–68 (1966) (holding that strict scrutiny is necessary to protect voting 
rights following Carolene); see Mary Jo Lang, The Importance of Being Narrowly Tailored:  
A Call for Strict Scrutiny for a Fundamental Right in Crawford v. Marion County Election 
Board, 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008), 88 NEB. L. REV. 582, 579–611 (2010). 
 210. See Lang, supra note 209; Harper, 383 U.S. at 667–68. 
 211. See Lang, supra note 209, at 603–06. 
 212. See Hasen, supra note 208. 
 213. See id. (“It might be far more effective to require heightened scrutiny for every 
election law that burdens voters.  But . . . flexibility is the key benefit of Anderson-Burdick in 
the context of the pandemic:  what ordinarily might appear to be a minor burden on voters, 
such as returning absentee ballots by a set deadline, becomes a severe burden when voters, 
through no fault of their own, cannot vote safely in person and cannot receive an absentee 
ballot to return by the set deadline.”). 
 214. Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REV. 69, 70–75 (2009); see 
also Rebecca Guthrie, Note, State Courts, the Right to Vote, and the Democracy Canon, 88 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1957, 1960–66, 1993–2009 (2020) (noting that many states have adopted 
the democracy canon as part of their state constitutions). 
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voter enfranchisement.215  The Democracy Canon functions to expand voter 
access and enfranchisement, working to promote opportunities for registered 
voters to vote and have their votes counted in a variety of contexts, including 
vote counting, voter eligibility and registration, and candidate and party 
competitiveness cases.216 
While many state judicial and legislative branches nationwide have 
endorsed and adopted the Democracy Canon as a useful standard for 
protecting legitimacy and voter enfranchisement,217 the canon also suffers 
from inconsistent application.  Moreover, foisting back onto legislatures a 
constant stream of ex ante corrections and adjustments to election rules in 
response to courts’ statutory interpretations is not only overburdensome on 
the legislative process but also potentially promotes “the actual and perceived 
politicization of the judiciary.”218 
3.  The Political Outcome Test 
The “Political Outcome” test is another interesting, yet untested, scholarly 
approach.219  This test represents a small change to the Anderson-Burdick 
balancing test that would target cases where political motivations are 
implicated.  Under this test, the court would consider factors indicating 
improper partisanship, such as whether a law:  (1) confers a political 
advantage to the enacting lawmakers or their party, (2) politically 
disadvantages their opponents or an opposing party, (3) dilutes or otherwise 
weakens the political participation of identifiable groups of voters, and (4) 
creates sharp division along party lines.220  Where this improper partisanship 
appears likely, a court’s presumption should shift in favor of the plaintiff, 
and the burden of showing that the law’s benefits outweigh its burden on 
voters should fall upon the state.221  However, although promising as an 
alternative test of constitutionality, the Political Outcome test is still 
vulnerable under the same conditions as the Anderson-Burdick balancing 
test; as the cases employing the Anderson-Burdick balancing test during the 
pandemic have shown, courts may still refuse to intervene on voters’ 
behalf—even when intervention is constitutionally justified—based on the 
Purcell principle of nonintervention. 
III.  A NEW APPROACH TO JUDICIAL INTERVENTION:  THE CAROLENE TEST 
This part introduces the Carolene test, designed as a threshold test that 
determines whether judicial intervention is appropriate in an equal protection 
 
 215. See Guthrie, supra note 214, at 1960. 
 216. See Hasen, supra note 214, at 82–84. 
 217. See Guthrie, supra note 214, at 1960 (surveying the Democracy Canon’s presence in 
election codes and general rules of statutory construction across all fifty states). 
 218. See Hasen, supra note 214, at 106. 
 219. See Matthew R. Pikor, Voter ID in Wisconsin:  A Better Approach to 
Anderson/Burdick Balancing, 10 SEVENTH CIR. REV. 465, 495 (2015). 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. (suggesting that considering the impact to political outcomes is an effective mode 
of addressing election regulations that are facially neutral but discriminatory as-applied). 
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challenge to any change in election administration.  First, this part outlines 
the Carolene test.  Next, this part demonstrates the Carolene test’s 
relationship to the principles discussed in Part II.  Finally, it applies the 
Carolene test using a case study from the 2020 election. 
A.  The Carolene Test 
This Note introduces the Carolene test, a novel standard for judicial review 
of voting rights claims against state and local elections administration made 
under the Equal Protection Clause.  The Carolene test applies the principles 
set forth in “Footnote Four” of United States v. Carolene Products222 in a 
novel threshold question that determines whether judicial intervention is 
appropriate in equal protection challenges in election administration cases.  
This approach proposes a threshold consideration of the appropriateness of 
judicial intervention in state legislatures’ constitutionally delegated authority 
over elections, based on a principle of expanding equity in the franchise by 
evaluating changes in access to the vote, including statutory changes, policy 
changes, court orders, and executive orders.  The Carolene test’s threshold 
determination of whether judicial intervention is appropriate to affirm or 
deny the constitutionality of those changes is based on a three-factor analysis:  
(1) whether the change is a state action in election administration that 
implicates the ability to participate in the political process; (2) whether the 
change may disproportionately affect discrete and insular minorities; and (3) 
whether the change would diminish access to, and exercise of, the 
franchise.223 
The voting rights jurisprudence in the era of COVID-19 signals an urgent 
need to reexamine the judicial approach to evaluating challenges to burdens 
on access to the vote under the Fourteenth Amendment.224  As the litigation 
throughout the COVID-19 pandemic has revealed, even outcomes that would 
otherwise succeed under the Anderson-Burdick framework are susceptible to 
being undermined by the Purcell principle, resulting in unpredictable judicial 
approaches to election law issues of ballot access and the right to vote.  The 
Purcell principle holds that judicial intervention is inappropriate on the eve 
of an election because it may undermine voter confidence in the election 
process and turn away otherwise-qualified voters.225  The Carolene test 
supplants the Purcell principle as a threshold examination, indicating that 
judicial intervention is appropriate at any time where state autonomy 
conflicts with equity, where the ability to participate in the political process 
is implicated, and where regulations adversely affect “discrete and insular 
minorities.”226  Furthermore, the concept of heightened scrutiny is based on 
 
 222. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 223. See id. 
 224. See Disability L. Ctr. of Alaska v. Meyer, 484 F. Supp. 3d 693, 697 (D. Alaska 2020); 
U.S. CONST. amend. I; id. amend. XIV, §§ 1–2, 5. 
 225. See supra Part I.C.3. 
 226. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4; see also Harper v. Va. State Bd. of 
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (holding that heightened scrutiny is necessary to protect 
voting rights following Carolene). 
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the judiciary’s acknowledgment that “searching judicial inquiry” into state 
action is particularly justified where “political processes ordinarily relied 
upon to protect minorities” have broken down.227 
The Carolene test is derived from the factors mentioned in the case’s 
so-called “Footnote Four,” which considers heightened scrutiny where a law 
“appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, 
such as those of the first ten amendments.”228  This threshold test is 
particularly appropriate for application in voting rights cases because these 
cases present precisely the sort of circumstances imagined by the Supreme 
Court in Carolene:  burdens on voters’ ability to access and exercise the 
franchise “restrict[] those political processes which can ordinarily be 
expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation” and are often 
directed at particular “religious . . . or national . . . or racial minorities.”229  
Furthermore, voting rights cases continue to arise in the second set of 
circumstances contemplated in Carolene:  where “prejudice against discrete 
and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to 
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon 
to protect minorities.”230 
B.  The Three Organizing Principles in the Carolene Test 
One key strength of the Carolene test is that it responds directly to the 
challenges of the so-called “counter-majoritarian difficulty,”231 which 
expresses a fundamental suspicion of judicial review over the decisions of 
elected officials functioning within their constitutional authority to determine 
the time, place, and manner of elections.232  The judiciary has a 
well-recognized special role in protecting the interests of groups that are 
relegated to a “position of political powerlessness” and are not served by the 
 
 227. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4; see  e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 77 (1980) (“[B]oth Carolene Products themes . . . 
ask us to focus . . . on whether the opportunity to participate either in the political process by 
which values are appropriately identified and accommodated, or in the accommodation those 
processes have reached, has been unduly constricted.”); Samuel Issacharoff, Political 
Judgments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 637, 654–55 (2001) (“The premise of both Carolene Products 
and the political process theories . . . is that intervention is required because an electoral lock 
on power has made the system unresponsive . . . .”). 
 228. See Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. 
 229. See id. 
 230. See id. 
 231. See Legal Theory Lexicon:  The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty, LEGAL THEORY 
BLOG (Sept. 9, 2012), https://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2012/09/legal-theory-lexicon-
the-counter-majoritarian-difficulty.html [https://perma.cc/GY5M-6673].  Generally, the 
countermajoritarian difficulty, a well-known constitutional theory attributed to Professor 
Alexander Bickel, expresses the fundamental democratic legitimacy issue raised when 
unelected judges review—and hold power to nullify—the actions of elected executive or 
legislative actors. Id. 
 232. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part 
One:  The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 334 n.1 (1998) (“[T]he 
proposition hardly requires citation.”). 
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“majoritarian political process.”233  Furthermore, Justice Harlan F. Stone 
addressed the Carolene factors in Footnote Four specifically to balance the 
countermajoritarian difficulty.234 
Where the highly fact-specific calculus of the Anderson-Burdick balancing 
test serves to limit judicial discretion,235 the Carolene test serves to limit 
judicial activism by prescribing courts’ particular function as a 
counterbalance to the political and administrative processes that tend to 
curtail members of underrepresented groups’ ability to participate in the 
political process. 
C.  The Carolene Test Applied 
This section applies the Carolene test, using the election law case of 
Disability Law Center v. Meyer236 as a case study that highlights the test’s 
outcomes and demonstrates its crucial role in filling a much-needed gap in 
equal protection election law claims. 
1.  Introduction to Disability Law Center v. Meyer 
Alaskan Lieutenant Governor Kevin Meyer wrote in May 2020 that 
“[b]alancing the interest in public health with the constitutional right to vote 
means the 2020 election will be unlike any we have seen in our lifetime.”237 
That same month, the Alaska legislature passed legislation extending the 
governor’s March 11, 2020, State of Alaska COVID-19 Disaster Declaration 
and providing for many pandemic-related administrative changes, including 
the unprecedented provision that, for the 2020 calendar year’s elections, “the 
lieutenant governor may . . . direct that a primary or general election to be 
held in the state in 2020 be held in the same manner as an election by mail . . . 
[and] may adopt regulations necessary to implement this section, including 
emergency regulations.”238 
 
 233. See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 486 (1982) (noting 
that the judiciary has a “special role in safeguarding the interests of those groups that are 
‘relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary 
protection from the majoritarian political process’” (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973))); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 553–54 (1964) 
(identifying a need for judicial review of malapportionment because “[n]o effective political 
remedy to obtain relief . . . appears to have been available”). 
 234. See Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 783–84. 
 235. See also Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 6 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating 
that where feasible, courts may consider allowing “election[s] to proceed without enjoining 
the statutory provisions at issue” to provide “a better record on which to judge their 
constitutionality . . . on the basis of historical facts rather than speculation”). 
 236. 484 F. Supp. 3d 693, 693 (D. Alaska 2020). 
 237. Press Release, Off. of Lieutenant Governor Kevin Meyer, State of Alaska to Focus on 
Ballot Access for August Primary (May 15, 2020), https://ltgov.alaska.gov/newsroom/2020/ 
05/state-of-alaska-to-focus-on-ballot-access-for-august-primary/ [https://perma.cc/PRQ2-
LZXT]. 
 238. 2020 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 10.  Previous versions of S.B. 241 contemplated not the 
calendar year 2020, but rather the “duration of the public health crisis.” Id. 
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The Alaska legislature provided a clear and unambiguous allowance for a 
fully by-mail election in 2020, contemplating the uncertainty and health 
crisis around the COVID-19 pandemic.239  However, despite the rising 
popularity of mail-in elections both generally and as a safety measure 
responding to the pandemic in the West Coast states of California, Hawaii, 
and Washington, Lieutenant Governor Meyer decided to proceed with 
in-person elections.240  He urged recruitment of poll workers statewide and 
encouraged voters concerned about their health risks to request absentee 
ballots, which require a timely request and a witness signature from an 
individual who is not a U.S. Postal Service employee.241 
In June 2020, Lieutenant Governor Meyer announced that the Alaska 
Division of Elections would automatically mail absentee ballot applications 
to all registered Alaska voters aged sixty-five and older.242  Immediately, 
members of the Alaska legislature and other community leaders urged 
Lieutenant Governor Meyer that easing the burdens on older voters not only 
discriminates on the basis of age but also favors white voters; while one-third 
of Alaskans younger than sixty-five are people of color, less than a quarter 
of Alaskans older than sixty-five are people of color.  These leaders instead 
encouraged the Alaska Division of Elections to automatically send mail-in 
ballot applications to all registered Alaska voters.243 
On July 17, 2020, a group of plaintiffs, including the Disability Law Center 
of Alaska, Native Peoples Action Community Fund, Alaska Public Interest 
Research Group, and two individuals, filed a complaint for declaratory and 
injunctive relief against the State of Alaska.  They requested that the state 
mail every registered Alaska voter a vote-by-mail ballot application ahead of 
the primary and general elections in August and November.244  The plaintiffs 
argued that choosing only a specific subset of the population to receive 
additional ease-of-voting access is a direct violation of the Twenty-Sixth 
 
 239. See id. 
 240. James Brooks, Lieutenant Governor Rules Out By-Mail Elections for Alaska’s August 
Primary, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (May 16, 2020), https://www.adn.com/politics/2020/ 
05/15/lieutenant-governor-rules-out-by-mail-elections-for-alaskas-august-primary/ 
[https://perma.cc/33Z7-MVPX]. 
 241. See James Brooks, In Rule Change, Postal Service Forbids Employees from Signing 
Absentee Ballots as Witnesses, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Aug. 19, 2020), 
https://www.adn.com/politics/2020/08/18/in-rule-change-postal-service-forbids-employees-
from-signing-absentee-ballots-as-witnesses/ [https://perma.cc/SAA6-QJX2]; Emily 
Hofstaedter, Lt. Governor Calls for More Poll Workers in Western Alaska Ahead of Primary 
Election, ALASKA PUB. MEDIA (Aug. 9, 2020), https://www.alaskapublic.org/2020/08/09/lt-
governor-calls-for-more-poll-workers-in-western-alaska-ahead-of-primary-election/ 
[https://perma.cc/YX6K-H4AQ]. 
 242. See Andrew Kitchenman, State Will Mail Absentee Ballot Applications to Seniors.  
Critics Say That Makes Ballot Access Unequal., ALASKA PUB. MEDIA (June 21, 2020), 
https://www.alaskapublic.org/2020/06/21/state-will-mail-absentee-ballot-applications-to-
seniors-critics-say-that-suppresses-young-minority-votes/ [https://perma.cc/8C3P-M5QN]. 
 243. See id. 
 244. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1–3, Disability L. Ctr. of Alaska 
v. Meyer, No. 3AN-20-07060-CI (Alaska Super. Ct. July 17, 2020), 
https://public.courts.alaska.gov/web/media/docs/dlc2/complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/6YB7-
H7MU]. 
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Amendment, which explicitly prohibits age discrimination in voting, and also 
brought challenges under the U.S. Constitution (First and Fourteenth 
Amendments), the Alaska Constitution (Article 1, Sections 1 and 3; Article 
2, Section 19; and Article 5, Section 1), and Title II of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990.245  The defendants, Lieutenant Governor Kevin 
Meyer and the Alaska Division of Elections, removed the case to federal 
court.246 
2.  Issues Raised in Disability Law Center 
The analysis presented in Disability Law Center implicates constitutional 
provisions, including the First Amendment (construing voting’s expressive 
function),247 the Fourteenth Amendment (construing the burdens and 
unequal ease on the right to vote as implicating the Due Process clause, the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause),248 the 
Fifteenth Amendment (forbidding the denial or abridgement of the right to 
vote on the basis of race),249 and the Twenty-Sixth Amendment (forbidding 
the denial or abridgement of the right to vote on the basis of age).250 
3.  Anderson-Burdick Analysis in Disability Law Center 
In Disability Law Center, the district court applied an Anderson-Burdick 
analysis and found that strict scrutiny did not apply in the state’s decision to 
send out mail-in ballot applications for the 2020 primaries to all Alaska 
voters over the age of sixty-five, a policy that eased the burden on elders to 
procure mail-in ballots for federal elections.  The court refused to grant the 
requested injunction to send out mail-in ballot applications to all registered 
Alaska voters.251  The plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit; amicus briefs 
arrived from a coalition of Alaskan disability rights groups including the 
Statewide Independent Living Council of Alaska, Access Alaska, and the 
Independent Living Center. 
4.  Disability Law Center and the Carolene Test 
Like many of the 2020 election cases,252 the underlying facts of Disability 
Law Center demonstrate the pressing need for the Carolene test’s threshold 
consideration of whether judicial intervention is appropriate, before 
 
 245. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
and 47 U.S.C.); Complaint, supra note 244, at 1–3. 
 246. Disability L. Ctr. of Alaska v. Meyer, 484 F. Supp. 3d 693, 697 (D. Alaska 2020); 
Defendant’s Notice of Removal, Disability L. Ctr. of Alaska, 484 F. Supp. 3d 693 (No. 20-cv-
00173), 2020 WL 4086630. 
 247. Disability L. Ctr. of Alaska, 484 F. Supp. 3d at 702–04; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 248. See id. at 702–04; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1–2, 5. 
 249. U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
 250. See Disability L. Ctr. of Alaska, 484 F. Supp. 3d at 702–04; U.S. CONST. amend. 
XXVI. 
 251. See Disability L. Ctr. of Alaska, 484 F. Supp. 3d at 701. 
 252. See supra Part II. 
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proceeding to the merits of the constitutional Equal Protection Clause claim.  
This Note applies the Carolene test to Disability Law Center, demonstrating 
the Carolene test’s threshold analysis for the appropriateness of judicial 
intervention.  As noted in Parts III.B.1 and III.B.3, the District of Alaska 
employed the Anderson-Burdick balancing test, determining that the burden 
on voters was slight and that the state interest was sufficiently weighty to 
justify imposing such a burden.253  Further, while the district court cited the 
Purcell principle as one legal element in its standard of review,254 it did not 
expressly apply the principle in its analysis, leaving unanswered the question 
of whether the court pursued a threshold analysis of the appropriateness of 
judicial intervention.255  Thus, this case provides a stellar example of an equal 
protection voting rights matter in which:  (1) the Purcell principle fails to 
fully determine whether judicial intervention is appropriate or not;256 (2) 
judicial intervention would be found appropriate based on the outcome of the 
Carolene test,257 justifying the reviewing court in proceeding to the 
constitutional analysis under the Anderson-Burdick balancing test; and (3) 
invalidation or alteration of the law in question would not necessarily be 
required based on the outcome of the Anderson-Burdick balancing test.258 
5.  The Carolene Test Applied 
As a threshold matter, Disability Law Center presents all three Carolene 
test factors, and thus judicial intervention is justified.  The change to be 
considered is the decision to automatically mail ballot applications to voters 
over the age of sixty-five but not to other groups disproportionately impacted 
by the COVID-19 pandemic. 
The first prong considers whether the change is a state action in election 
administration that affects the ability to participate in the political process.259  
Here, the change relates directly to the ability to participate in the political 
process:  the citizen’s right to vote is fundamental and well-recognized as 
one of the core avenues of participation in the political process.260  Thus, like 
many voting rights claims, Disability Law Center presents a clear and direct 
implication of participation in the political process. 
The second prong considers whether the change may affect discrete and 
insular minorities.261  Here, the change made a big impact by easing the 
 
 253. See supra Parts III.C.1, III.C.3. 
 254. See Disability L. Ctr. of Alaska, 484 F. Supp. 3d at 699–700. 
 255. See id. 
 256. See id. 
 257. See infra Part III.C.5. 
 258. Crucially, Disability Law Center demonstrates that it is possible to find contrary 
outcomes between the Carolene test’s threshold question of the appropriateness of judicial 
intervention and the Anderson-Burdick balancing test’s constitutional analysis weighing 
burdens and state interests. See supra Part III.C.3.  These contrary outcomes illustrate that the 
Carolene test is not determinative of, reiterative of, or coextensive with the Anderson-Burdick 
balancing test. See id. 
 259. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 260. See supra Parts III.A, III.B.1. 
 261. See Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. 
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burden on voters over the age of sixty-five but also impacted rural Alaska 
Native voters, who already face immense procedural and logistical hurdles 
to accessing the voting process and exercising the franchise.262  It also favors 
white voters because, while one-third of Alaskans younger than sixty-five are 
people of color, less than a quarter of Alaskans older than sixty-five are 
people of color.263  Easing the requirements for some voters does not 
necessarily directly burden others.  Nevertheless, this change has the 
potential to disproportionately affect discrete and insular minorities because 
it may lead to increased ease of access for some voters, while failing to extend 
a significant benefit to voters who already face immense challenges. 
The third prong is whether the change would, in effect, diminish access to, 
or exercise of, the franchise.264  This third prong synthesizes the findings of 
the first two prongs.265  If implemented, this proposed change would entirely 
remove the burden of applying for an online ballot application on voters over 
the age of sixty-five, while leaving the burden in place as an additional step 
required of all other voters in order to access and exercise their right to 
vote.266  It is important to note that this threshold test is not a replacement of 
the Anderson-Burdick balancing test.  Under the Carolene test, it is sufficient 
to demonstrate that the change has the effect of diminishing access to, or 
exercise of, the franchise for some voters relative to others.  Here, the change 
would, in effect, leave in place an administrative burden on rural Alaskan 
voters, Alaskans with disabilities, and indeed all other voters under the age 
of sixty-five when that burden diminishes their opportunity to access and 
exercise the franchise relative to all other voters in the state. 
Since all three Carolene test factors are met, judicial review and 
intervention is appropriate.  The reviewing court may proceed to a 
 
 262. See supra Part III.C.1; see also Nathaniel Herz, Here’s Why Alaska Is the Slowest in 
the Nation When It Comes to Vote Counting, ALASKA PUB. MEDIA (Nov. 5, 2020), 
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60-of-its-votes-heres-why/ [https://perma.cc/56XN-9YR6] (“State officials said the [long 
process] stems from Alaska’s huge size and complicated logistics:  It has polling places in 
dozens of villages with no road access.”); Patty Ferguson-Bohnee, How the Native American 
Vote Continues to Be Suppressed, AM BAR ASS’N (Feb. 9. 2020), 
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homes . . . .  [C]oncerns exist for Alaska Native voters in rural villages who rely on shared 
P.O. boxes, and at times, mail delivery may take up to three weeks due to weather.  In addition, 
many Native American languages are oral; therefore, language assistance to Native American 
voters requires in-person translations, which cannot be done through mail.”). 
 263. See supra Part III.C.1. 
 264. See Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. 
 265. See supra Parts III.A, III.B, III.C.1. 
 266. See supra Part III.C.1. 
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constitutional analysis of the equal protection claim and may intervene, 
reverse, or alter the change, if it is found unconstitutional. 
CONCLUSION 
Challenges brought by litigants seeking to protect their voting rights 
during the 2020 election demonstrated significant tension between state 
autonomy and authority to act, challenges to equity and expanding the 
franchise with the Anderson-Burdick framework, and the challenges of 
judicial intervention, including the Purcell principle.  Given the vulnerability 
of the Anderson-Burdick equal protection framework in interaction with the 
Purcell principle demonstrated in the 2020 election cases and the 
inadequacies of the existing proposed resolutions to surmount the challenge, 
the Carolene test presents a strong case for courts considering equal 
protection claims under the Anderson-Burdick framework to reject the 
Purcell principle and instead apply a threshold determination of the 
appropriateness of judicial intervention, which examines changes in election 
law and evaluates—based on whether the change is a state action in election 
administration that affects the ability to participate in the political process—
whether the change demonstrates prejudice against discrete and insular 
minorities and whether the change would expand or diminish the franchise. 
